

## **H HEURISTICS**

*Navigating a Changing World*

# **Designing a Global Strategy for Polycrisis Risk Reduction**

*Integrating Climate Resilience, Development Finance, Energy Transition, and Institutional Capacity*

Why Coupled Risks Require a Four-Pillar Strategy, and Where Scarce Capital and Capacity Should Concentrate

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## Abstract

The defining danger of the current period is not the size of any single hazard but the coupling between hazards. Since 2020 a pandemic, a food and energy price spike, the sharpest rise in global borrowing costs in a generation, an accelerating run of climate extremes, and a fragmenting geopolitics have arrived on top of one another — and, crucially, transmitted their stress into one another. This report treats that condition, commonly labelled "polycrisis", as an analytical problem rather than a slogan: shocks that originate in one system now propagate rapidly into the others through a small number of shared channels — prices, exchange rates, fiscal space, credit, and confidence — so that the cost of managing them separately has become prohibitive. It argues that the coupling, not the individual shocks, is what a strategy must target.

The report sets out a strategy built on four pillars pursued together: climate resilience, which limits the frequency and severity of the physical shocks increasingly driving the system; development finance, which determines whether countries have the fiscal space to absorb any shock at all; the energy transition, reframed as risk reduction because it simultaneously cuts emissions, reduces exposure to imported-fuel price shocks, and can harden power systems; and institutional capacity, the anticipatory, delivery, and data functions that turn money and technology into outcomes. The core claim is that these four are complements, not a menu — each lowers the cost and raises the return of the others — so that the return to pursuing them as one integrated agenda far exceeds the sum of pursuing them separately.

The binding constraints are financial and institutional, not technical. The highest-return interventions are known and their benefit–cost ratios are exceptional: roughly four to one for resilient infrastructure, above ten to one for adaptation broadly, and around nine to one for multi-hazard early warning. Yet UNCTAD reports developing-country external debt at a record US\$11.4 trillion and net interest payments at US\$921 billion in 2024, with 3.4 billion people living in countries that spend more on debt service than on health or education; the UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2025 puts adaptation needs at US\$310–365 billion a year by 2035 against international public flows of just US\$26 billion; and clean-energy investment, now roughly twice that in fossil fuels globally, barely reaches developing economies outside China because of a 400–800 basis-point cost-of-capital wedge. The returns concentrate in a small set of double- and triple-duty investments — digital ID and payments, early warning, adaptive social protection, distributed clean energy, and resolved debt — that strengthen several pillars at once.

The report establishes the analytical and empirical foundations, sets out the four-pillar framework, examines each pillar and the synergies between them, inventories the financing architecture assembled since 2022 and the capitalisation gap that plagues it, confronts the problem of governing a strategy in what the risk analysts call an "age of competition", proposes a three-tier sequencing rule, and grounds the argument in country experience — Barbados, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and Kenya, alongside the cautionary case of Indonesia's Just Energy Transition Partnership. Its central finding is that the countries which absorb shocks well are distinguished less by their wealth or exposure than by whether they built and protected the enabling capacity — fiscal space, delivery institutions, pre-arranged finance, durable coordination — before the shocks arrived; and that the task for the rest of the decade is not to invent a resilience agenda but to fund it, integrate it, and build it in advance.

**Keywords:** polycrisis; systemic risk; risk transmission; climate resilience; adaptation finance; development finance; sovereign debt; cost of capital; energy transition; energy security; institutional capacity; anticipatory action; adaptive social protection; early warning systems; blended finance; MDB reform; loss and damage

**JEL classification:** Q54, F34, H63, O19, G28; climate and natural disasters; international lending and sovereign debt; debt and fiscal policy; economic development and international linkages; government policy and financial regulation

**Data and method:** This report synthesises institutional and peer-reviewed research on systemic risk, climate resilience, development finance, and the energy transition, including the *WEF Global Risks Report 2026*; the *UNDRR Global Assessment Report* and WMO disaster-loss data; the *UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2025*; UNCTAD's *A World of Debt 2025* and World Bank and IMF debt analyses; the *IEA World Energy Investment 2025* and *Tracking SDG7* reports; the World Bank *State of Social Protection Report 2025*; the 2025 Sevilla Commitment (FfD4) and the COP30 outcome in Belém; and primary reporting on country programmes in Barbados, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Rwanda, and Kenya. Every quantitative claim is attributed inline to a primary or authoritative secondary source. Figures 1 and 3 are conceptual schematics; Figure 2 is an illustrative decadal series reflecting documented WMO trends; Figures 5 and 7 are explicitly illustrative. The report is analytical rather than predictive.

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# 1. Introduction: The Case for a Strategy

*The world has become very good at responding to crises one at a time and very bad at preventing them from arriving together. This report is about the difference, and about what a deliberate strategy to close that gap would contain.*

The first quarter of the twenty-first century has taught a hard lesson about how modern risk behaves. A pandemic did not stay a health crisis: it became an education crisis, a debt crisis, and a supply-chain crisis. A war in Europe did not stay a security crisis: it became a food crisis and an energy crisis that raised prices in countries that had never heard the front line. A cycle of interest-rate rises intended to tame inflation in the advanced economies became, in dozens of developing countries, a fiscal crisis that is still crowding out spending on the very things — health, education, adaptation — that would make the next shock survivable. None of these events waited its turn. Each landed on economies still absorbing the last, and each transmitted its stress into systems that looked, on paper, unrelated.

The word that has attached itself to this pattern is "polycrisis": the simultaneous, interacting operation of crises across distinct systems, such that the combined effect exceeds the sum of the parts. The term is now common enough to have become slightly worn, and it is sometimes used to mean nothing more than "many bad things at once." This report uses it more precisely, and more usefully. The claim is not that the world faces an unusual number of problems. It is that the problems are increasingly *coupled* — a shock in one system now propagates rapidly into the others through a small number of shared channels — and that the coupling, not the individual shocks, is what makes the current period dangerous and what a strategy must target.

If that diagnosis is right, it has a sharp implication. Managing each crisis in its own silo — a food policy here, a debt negotiation there, a climate fund somewhere else — is not merely inefficient. It is the central strategic error, because it treats as independent a set of risks that are in fact one interconnected system. The alternative is not a single global plan imposed from above; no such thing is possible or desirable. It is a *strategy* in the proper sense: a small number of integrated priorities, chosen because they reduce risk across several systems at once, sequenced so that each protects the returns of the others, and pursued by many actors who share a common frame even when they do not share a chain of command.

This report sets out what such a strategy would contain. It argues that polycrisis risk reduction rests on four pillars that must be pursued together: climate resilience, which limits the frequency and severity of the physical shocks that increasingly drive the whole system; development finance, which determines whether countries have the fiscal space to absorb any shock at all; the energy transition, which simultaneously cuts emissions, reduces exposure to imported-fuel price spikes, and can harden the power systems everything else depends on; and institutional capacity, the anticipatory, delivery, and data functions of the state and the multilateral system that turn money and technology into outcomes. The pillars are not a menu. The report's core argument is that they are complements — each one lowers the cost and raises the return of the others — and that the returns to pursuing them as an integrated agenda are far larger than the sum of pursuing them separately.

The report is written for a specific moment. In 2025 the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development adopted the Sevilla Commitment, the first intergovernmental financing framework agreed since 2015, and the COP30 climate conference in Belém produced a finance package built around a tripling

of adaptation finance and a roadmap toward US\$1.3 trillion a year for developing countries by 2035 ([UN DESA, \*Compromiso de Sevilla / Sevilla Commitment\* adopted](#); [Carbon Brief, \*COP30: Key Outcomes Agreed at the UN Climate Talks in Belém\*](#)). At the same time, the World Economic Forum's *Global Risks Report 2026* describes an "age of competition" in which geoeconomic confrontation has become the risk most likely to trigger a global crisis, and cooperation is harder to organize than at any point in a generation ([WEF, \*Global Risks Report 2026\*](#)). The strategy this report describes therefore has to work not in an idealized world of abundant cooperation but in the fragmented one that actually exists. That constraint runs through every section.


The remainder of the report proceeds in four movements. Sections 2 and 3 establish the analytical and empirical foundations: what polycrisis risk is, and how large the shock load has become. Section 4 sets out the four-pillar framework. Sections 5 through 8 examine each pillar in turn — the evidence on what works, and the linkages to the others. Sections 9 through 12 turn from diagnosis to design: how the pillars reinforce one another, how the strategy is financed, how it is governed in a fragmented system, and how its elements should be sequenced. Sections 13 and 14 ground the argument in country experience and in the metrics that would tell us whether it is working. Section 15 concludes.

## 2. What Polycrisis Risk Is — and Why It Needs a Strategy

*The distinctive danger of the present is not the size of any single hazard but the transmission between hazards. A strategy has to target the channels along which shocks travel, not just the shocks themselves.*

Start with a distinction that the everyday use of "polycrisis" tends to blur. There is a difference between an aggregation of risks and a *system* of risks. An aggregation is a list: climate change, and debt, and pandemics, and conflict, each bad in its own right, each analyzed and managed on its own terms. A system is something more specific — a set of risks connected by feedback, so that the state of one changes the probability or severity of the others. The 2022 *Global Assessment Report* of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction made exactly this point, arguing that the world had entered a period of "systemic risk" in which hazards cascade across the boundaries that used to contain them, and that risk-management institutions built for discrete, sectoral hazards are structurally unsuited to it ([UNDRR, \*Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2022\*](#)). Polycrisis, in the sense this report uses, is the economic and geopolitical face of that systemic condition.

The mechanism that turns an aggregation into a system is transmission. Consider how a single shock — a sharp rise in global interest rates — moves through a typical developing economy. It raises the cost of servicing dollar debt, which consumes fiscal space. The currency depreciates, which raises the local-currency price of imported food and fuel, driving up hunger and the subsidy bill at the same time. Higher import bills widen the current-account deficit and drain reserves. Capital-intensive projects — including the solar and grid investments that would reduce fuel dependence — become unfinanceable because their economics are dominated by the cost of capital. And the government, its budget now absorbed by debt service, cuts precisely the social-protection and adaptation spending that would have cushioned the next climate shock. One monetary event has propagated into finance, food, energy, climate, and the capacity of the state, without any of those systems failing on its own terms. Figure 1 renders this coupling as a network: the nodes are familiar hazards, but the edges — the couplings between them — are where the risk actually lives.



**Figure 1.** *Polycrisis as a system, not a list: coupled global risks and the strength of their interactions.*

Source: author's schematic. Node selection follows the risk domains emphasised by the WEF Global Risks Report 2026, UNDRR GAR 2022, and IMF and UNCTAD analysis; edge weights are an illustrative reading of the strength of coupling between domains, not an empirical estimate. The point of the figure is the density of strong and moderate links, not any single edge.

Three properties of coupled-risk systems matter for strategy. The first is that the transmission channels are few and shared. However varied the shocks, they tend to travel along the same handful of routes: prices, exchange rates, fiscal space, credit conditions, and confidence. That is discouraging in one sense — it means almost any shock can reach almost any system — but encouraging in another, because it means an intervention that strengthens one of those channels defends against a wide range of shocks. Widening fiscal space protects a country whether the next blow is a drought, a pandemic, or a spike in bond yields. This is the analytical basis for a strategy: because the channels are shared, the highest-value investments are the ones that strengthen a channel rather than counter a specific hazard.

The second property is threshold behaviour. Coupled systems do not degrade smoothly; they absorb stress until a buffer is exhausted and then shift state abruptly. A country can service its debt through several shocks and then, past a point, cannot — and the move from "managing" to "crisis" happens in weeks. A grid can ride out demand growth until a drought cuts hydropower below a threshold and load-shedding begins. Strategy in a threshold system is largely about buffers: maintaining the fiscal, physical, and institutional

reserves that keep the system on the safe side of its tipping points, and recognizing that rebuilding a buffer after it is exhausted is far more expensive than maintaining it beforehand.


The third property is that the shocks are increasingly correlated in time. For much of the postwar period, a reasonable planning assumption was that major shocks were roughly independent — that a debt crisis and a natural disaster and a political crisis would, on average, arrive years apart, leaving room to recover between them. Climate change breaks that assumption directly, by raising the base rate of extreme-weather shocks so that several can strike in a single season; and a fragmenting geopolitics breaks it in a second way, by making trade, financial, and security shocks more likely to cluster. When shocks correlate, the diversification that used to make a portfolio of risks manageable stops working, and the system faces its stresses together rather than in sequence.

These three properties — shared channels, thresholds, and correlation — are why the response has to be a strategy rather than a set of policies. A policy optimizes a single objective: cheaper food, more electricity, lower emissions. A strategy chooses among objectives under the recognition that they interact, that resources and attention are finite, and that the sequence in which things are done changes what is possible later. The rest of this report is an attempt to specify that strategy: to identify the small number of investments that strengthen shared channels, rebuild buffers, and hold across correlated shocks, and to say how they fit together.

### 3. The Global Risk Landscape: A Data Portrait

*Before designing a response, it is worth being precise about the scale of the problem. The load of shocks the system must absorb has risen sharply on every available measure — even as, encouragingly, the human cost per shock has fallen.*

The clearest long-run evidence comes from weather and climate. The World Meteorological Organization's atlas of disaster losses finds that the number of recorded weather, climate, and water-related disasters increased roughly fivefold between 1970 and 2019, and that the associated economic losses rose by a factor of seven, to a cumulative total on the order of US\$4.3 trillion over the period ([WMO, \*Weather-Related Disasters Increase over Past 50 Years, Causing More Damage but Fewer Deaths\*](#)). The trend has not levelled off: losses in the 2010s exceeded those of any previous decade, and the early 2020s are on a comparable or higher trajectory. Figure 2 shows the decadal pattern — and shows, alongside it, one of the few genuinely hopeful trends in the whole risk landscape.



**Figure 2.** Rising economic losses, falling mortality: recorded weather and climate disaster losses and reported deaths, by decade.

Source: illustrative decadal series constructed to reflect the trends documented in the WMO Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water Extremes (economic losses up roughly sevenfold and recorded deaths down roughly threefold across the half-century to 2019). Decadal values are approximate and shown to convey direction and relative magnitude, not precise totals; the 2020s bar is partial.

That hopeful trend is the decline in deaths. Even as the frequency and cost of disasters rose, recorded mortality fell by roughly a factor of three over the same half-century — a reduction attributable in large part to better forecasting, earlier warning, and improved disaster management ([WMO, \*Economic Costs of Weather-Related Disasters Soars but Early Warnings Save Lives\*](#)). The divergence between the two lines in Figure 2 is one of the most important facts in this report, and it recurs throughout. It shows that the human cost of a rising hazard load is not fixed by the hazard: it is powerfully mediated by the presence or absence

of the warning systems, the protective infrastructure, and the institutional capacity that this report groups under its four pillars. The physical shock is exogenous; much of the damage is a policy choice.

The economic and financial dimension of the risk load is captured most vividly in the debt figures examined in Section 6, but a summary belongs here. The United Nations reports that developing-country external debt reached a record US\$11.4 trillion, that net interest payments on public debt hit US\$921 billion in 2024, and that 3.4 billion people now live in countries that spend more on servicing their debt than on health or education ([UNCTAD, \*A World of Debt 2025\*](#)). The share of low-income countries assessed to be in, or at high risk of, debt distress has roughly doubled since 2015 to around one half. This is the fiscal counterpart to the rising physical hazard: the buffer that would let a country respond to a shock has, for a large part of the developing world, been consumed in advance.

The forward-looking view is captured in the annual risk perceptions of the global business, policy, and civil-society communities surveyed by the World Economic Forum. The *Global Risks Report 2026* finds that, over a ten-year horizon, environmental risks remain the most severe category, with extreme weather ranked the single most severe risk and half of the top ten risks environmental in nature. Over the short term, however, the picture has shifted markedly toward conflict and fragmentation: geoeconomic confrontation — the use of trade restrictions, sanctions, and economic policy as instruments of geopolitical rivalry — vaulted from eighth place to first and is judged the risk most likely to trigger a material global crisis in 2026, while the adverse outcomes of artificial intelligence recorded the largest long-term climb of any risk ([WEF, \*Global Risks Report 2026: Key Findings\*](#)). The report's framing of an "age of competition" is not incidental to this study's argument; it is the environment in which any strategy for coordinated risk reduction now has to be built.

Two conclusions follow from the data portrait. First, the shock load is rising across environmental, financial, and geopolitical domains at once — which is itself an instance of the coupling described in Section 2, since a fragmenting geopolitics both raises the odds of economic shocks and erodes the cooperation needed to manage the environmental ones. Second, and against that, the mortality trend shows that the relationship between hazard and harm is not fixed. The remainder of this report is about how to bend that relationship — how to keep the human and economic cost of a rising hazard load from rising with it — through an integrated strategy rather than a scramble of separate responses.

## 4. A Framework: Four Integrated Pillars

*The strategy rests on four pillars — climate resilience, development finance, the energy transition, and institutional capacity. What makes them a strategy rather than a checklist is that they are complements: each lowers the cost and raises the return of the others.*

The choice of four pillars is deliberate and, the report will argue, close to minimal. Each corresponds to a different function in the risk system. Climate resilience addresses the *drivers and impacts* of the fastest-growing class of shocks, reducing both how often physical hazards strike and how much damage they do when they do. Development finance addresses the *capacity to absorb* any shock, because the ability to respond to a food, energy, health, or climate emergency is, in the end, a fiscal question. The energy transition addresses a specific, unusually leveraged *exposure*: dependence on imported fossil fuels, whose prices transmit shocks into the balance of payments, the budget, and the cost of living, and whose combustion drives the climate hazard in the first place. And institutional capacity addresses the *conversion* problem — the persistent gap between money and technology on one side and outcomes on the other, which is bridged only by states and multilateral bodies able to plan, deliver, and hold a strategy steady over time.

Table 1 sets out the four pillars: the strategic objective of each, the core instruments through which it is pursued, the principal institutions that carry it, and a headline metric against which progress can be judged. The table is a map of the sections that follow, but it also makes the framework's central claim visible in a single view — that the four are not alternatives competing for the same budget line but functions that must operate together for any of them to deliver its full return.


**Table 1. The four pillars of a polycrisis risk-reduction strategy**

| Pillar                     | Strategic objective                                                                      | Core instruments                                                                                                                 | Lead institutions                                               | Headline metric                                                                                  |
|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| I. Climate resilience      | Cut the frequency and severity of physical shocks and the damage they cause              | Adaptation investment; multi-hazard early warning; resilient design codes; risk pooling and loss-and-damage finance              | UNFCCC; national adaptation agencies; WMO; risk-pool facilities | Adaptation finance vs. the US\$310–365B/yr need; early-warning coverage toward universal by 2027 |
| II. Development finance    | Restore the fiscal space and lower the cost of capital needed to absorb any shock        | Debt relief and restructuring; MDB reform and guarantees; local-currency and concessional lending; state-contingent debt clauses | IMF; World Bank and MDBs; G20; national debt offices            | Sovereign borrowing spreads; share of low-income countries in debt distress                      |
| III. Energy transition     | Cut emissions while reducing fuel-import exposure and hardening power systems            | Distributed renewables plus storage; grid interconnection; blended finance; just-transition partnerships                         | IEA; IRENA; national utilities; regional power pools; JETPs     | Clean-energy investment reaching developing economies; population without reliable power         |
| IV. Institutional capacity | Convert finance and technology into delivered outcomes, and anticipate rather than react | Anticipatory action and pre-arranged finance; adaptive social protection; digital ID and payments; project-                      | National governments; UN agencies; Pandemic Fund; Global Shield | Share of relief that is pre-arranged; social-protection coverage of the vulnerable               |

| Pillar | Strategic objective | Core instruments             | Lead institutions | Headline metric |
|--------|---------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
|        |                     | preparation and data systems |                   |                 |

Headline metrics are indicative reference points drawn from the sources discussed in Sections 5–8, not official targets of any single body. "MDB" denotes the multilateral development banks.

The relationships between the pillars are as important as the pillars themselves, and Figure 3 gives them a structure. Read from the top down, it shows the compounding drivers of Section 2 — climate change, the high cost of capital and debt, energy insecurity, and geoeconomic fragmentation — bearing down on all four pillars at once. Read across the middle, it shows the pillars as mutually reinforcing rather than parallel. And read to the bottom, it shows the shared objective: not the elimination of shocks, which is impossible, but the reduction of *systemic* risk — fewer shocks crossing into cascades, development gains protected from reversal, and recovery that is faster and cheaper because the machinery to deliver it was built in advance.



**Figure 3.** The four-pillar strategy: compounding drivers bear on all four pillars, which reinforce one another and jointly reduce systemic risk.

Source: author's framework. The schematic is organising rather than quantitative; the strength of the cross-pillar reinforcement it asserts is examined empirically in Section 9 and Figure 7.

Two features of the framework deserve emphasis before the pillars are examined individually. The first is that the pillars are sequenced by dependency, not by importance. Development finance appears second not because it matters less than climate resilience but because, in a country whose budget is consumed by debt

service, almost nothing else on the list is affordable; fiscal space is the precondition, which is why Section 12's discussion of sequencing places debt relief early for the most distressed countries. The second is that institutional capacity, the fourth pillar, is in a sense the binding one: it is the pillar that determines whether spending on the other three produces adaptation and access and clean power, or produces reports. A strategy that funds the first three pillars while neglecting the fourth will underperform its budget, sometimes dramatically. The sections that follow take the pillars in the order of Table 1, and Section 9 then returns to the interactions among them directly.


## 5. Pillar I — Climate Resilience and Adaptation

*Adaptation is among the highest-return public investments available anywhere, and among the most severely underfinanced. Closing that gap is the first pillar because climate change is the driver most directly raising the frequency of the shocks the whole strategy must absorb.*

The physical case for prioritizing climate resilience is straightforward: the hazard is large, growing, and concentrated where the capacity to absorb it is weakest. Heat, drought, extreme rainfall, and tropical-cyclone intensity are all increasing, and they are increasing fastest in the tropical and sub-tropical regions where a larger share of output, employment, and infrastructure is exposed to weather. Each major climate extreme arrives, in the polycrisis frame of Section 2, as an unbudgeted fiscal shock layered on top of whatever else is in train — the 2022 Pakistan floods, whose damages and losses ran to roughly US\$30 billion; successive Horn of Africa drought seasons; the 2024 Southern African drought that pushed tens of millions into acute food insecurity. The physical shock is exogenous. The scale of the damage, as Figure 2 showed, is not.

What makes adaptation the natural first pillar is that its economics are unusually favourable — favourable enough that the failure to fund it is one of the clearest market and governance failures in the whole risk landscape. The World Bank's *Lifelines* analysis found that building resilience into new infrastructure in low- and middle-income countries adds only about 3 percent to upfront costs while returning around four dollars for every dollar invested ([World Bank / GFDRR, \*Lifelines: The Resilient Infrastructure Opportunity\*](#)). A 2025 World Resources Institute study of 320 real adaptation investments across twelve countries found an average benefit–cost ratio above ten to one, with more than half the benefits accruing whether or not a disaster actually strikes — because resilient assets are also more productive assets ([WRI, \*Climate Adaptation Investments Yield Massive Returns\*](#)). The single highest-return category is multi-hazard early warning, which the World Meteorological Organization values at roughly nine dollars of avoided loss per dollar spent, and which is the mechanism most responsible for the falling-mortality line in Figure 2; countries with limited warning coverage suffer on the order of six times the disaster mortality of well-covered ones ([WMO, \*The Triple Dividends of Early Warning Systems and Climate Services\*](#)).

Against those returns, the financing is a fraction of what is required. The UNEP *Adaptation Gap Report 2025*, subtitled *Running on Empty*, estimates developing-country adaptation needs at around US\$310 billion a year on a modelled basis by 2035, or US\$365 billion built up from countries' own national adaptation plans, against international public adaptation finance flows of just US\$26 billion in 2023 — down from US\$28 billion the year before ([UNEP, \*Adaptation Gap Report 2025\*](#)). The gap is twelve to fourteen times, and it is widening. Figure 4 shows the mismatch. The same report carries one genuinely encouraging finding: 172 of 197 countries now have a national adaptation plan or equivalent, so the pipeline of things to finance exists. What is missing is the money — and, as Section 8 argues, the institutional machinery to convert plans into bankable projects.



**Figure 4.** The adaptation finance gap: estimated developing-country adaptation cost and need by 2035 versus international public adaptation finance flows in 2023.

Source: UNEP, Adaptation Gap Report 2025 ("Running on Empty"). The modelled cost and the NDC/NAP-based need are central estimates for 2035; the flow figure is the reported 2023 value. Even with supportive policy, private finance is estimated to add only on the order of US\$50 billion a year — still far short of the gap.

The resilience pillar has three components, and the strategy needs all three. The first is *avoided loss through adaptation and early warning* — the resilient roads, the drought-tolerant seed, the flood defences, and above all the warning systems that let people and assets get out of the way. The UN's Early Warnings for All initiative aims to give every person on Earth access to a multi-hazard early warning system by 2027; as of the most recent stocktake, around 119 countries reported having such a system, roughly 60 percent of the total and up sharply over the decade, but with the largest remaining gaps precisely in the least-developed countries and small island states that need them most ([UNDRR, \*Early Warning Systems Reach New Heights, but Critical Gaps Jeopardize Global Progress\*](#)). Closing that last gap is among the highest-return actions in this entire report.

The second component is *risk transfer* — insurance, regional risk pools, and contingent finance that spread the cost of a disaster over time and across countries so that a single event does not overwhelm a single budget. Sovereign and regional risk pools in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Pacific already demonstrate the model; the challenge, taken up in Sections 10 and 12, is to pre-arrange far more of the finance that flows after a disaster, so that it arrives in days rather than months and on terms that do not add to the debt stock. The third component is *addressing the losses adaptation cannot prevent*. The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, agreed at COP28 and operationalized over 2024–2025, is the first dedicated multilateral channel for this; its early capitalization — pledges of well under a billion dollars against needs estimated in the hundreds of billions — is examined in Section 10 as the starkest single instance of the capitalization gap running through the strategy ([UNFCCC, \*Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage\*](#)). Together the three components define the resilience pillar: prevent what can be prevented, transfer what can be transferred, and stand behind the residual — and do all three through institutions that are, at present, an order of magnitude too small.


## 6. Pillar II — Development Finance and Fiscal Space

*Finance is the pillar through which every other shock is ultimately absorbed or not. For much of the developing world the fiscal space to respond has been consumed by debt service, and the cost of new capital is several times what a comparable advanced economy would pay. Nothing else in the strategy is affordable until this is addressed.*

The numbers describing developing-country debt in the mid-2020s are without modern precedent. UNCTAD reports total external debt of developing economies at a record US\$11.4 trillion and their public debt at around US\$31 trillion — close to a third of the global total. Net interest payments on public debt reached US\$921 billion in 2024, up roughly 10 percent in a single year. A record 61 developing countries now spend at least a tenth of government revenue on interest alone, and 3.4 billion people live in countries that spend more on servicing debt than on health or education ([UNCTAD, \*A World of Debt 2025\*](#); [UNCTAD, \*Developing Countries Face Record-High Public Debt Burdens\*](#)). In 2023, developing countries paid a record US\$1.4 trillion to service their foreign debt, and for many the direction of flow has reversed: they now transfer more to external creditors than they receive in new financing ([World Bank, \*Developing Countries Paid Record US\\$1.4 Trillion on Foreign Debt in 2023\*](#)). Debt distress has spread accordingly: among the low-income countries eligible for the IMF's concessional lending, the share in, or at high risk of, distress has roughly doubled since 2015 to around one half ([IMF, \*List of LIC Debt Sustainability Analyses\*](#)).

The rise is not primarily a story of reckless borrowing. It reflects the compounding of Section 2 made concrete: pandemic-era emergency spending, the post-2022 surge in global interest rates, currency depreciation that inflated the local-currency cost of dollar debt, and a shift in the creditor base toward commercial bondholders and non-Paris-Club lenders that has made restructuring slower and harder to coordinate. The result is a fiscal trap. The same shocks that create the need for resilience spending simultaneously destroy the fiscal space to pay for it, and every dollar of interest is a dollar not spent on the adaptation, energy, and institutional investments that would reduce the next shock. Debt is where the polycrisis is most tightly self-reinforcing, which is why the strategy treats fiscal space as the precondition for everything else.

The second half of the financial problem afflicts even countries that are not in distress: the sheer cost of capital. Emerging-market and developing-economy sovereigns, and the projects they host, borrow at rates that typically run 400 to 800 basis points above what a comparable advanced economy would pay — a premium driven by currency risk, perceived political risk, and shallow domestic capital markets ([LSE Grantham Institute / Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, \*Raising Ambition and Accelerating Delivery of Climate Finance\*](#)). Figure 5 illustrates why that wedge is decisive. For a capital-intensive investment such as a solar plant or a grid, whose costs are almost entirely upfront, the cost of capital dominates the levelised cost of output; a doubling of the discount rate can roughly double the price of the electricity produced. The wedge can therefore turn an investment with a large social return into one that no private financier will touch — which is precisely why so much of the resilience and energy agenda stalls at the financing stage despite excellent fundamentals.



**Figure 5.** *The cost-of-capital wedge: illustrative all-in financing costs for a comparable clean-energy project in an advanced versus an emerging or developing economy.*

Source: author's illustration of the 400–800 basis-point sovereign risk premium documented by the LSE Grantham Institute and the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance. Values are stylised. Because a clean-energy project's economics are dominated by upfront capital, this wedge can roughly double the levelised cost of its output.

The 2025 Financing for Development conference in Sevilla was the international system's formal response to both halves of the problem. The Sevilla Commitment it adopted — the first intergovernmental financing framework agreed since the 2015 Addis Ababa Agenda — is organized around three fronts: mobilizing investment at scale, resolving the debt and development crisis, and reforming the international financial architecture. It was accompanied by more than 130 concrete initiatives, including a push to triple the lending capacity of the multilateral development banks, a borrowers' forum to strengthen debtor countries' hand in negotiations, and work toward a global debt registry and wider use of state-contingent debt clauses that pause repayments automatically after a disaster ([UN DESA, \*Sevilla Commitment adopted\*](#); [UN, \*FfD4 Closing Press Release\*](#)). These are the right targets. The MDB-reform agenda in particular — optimizing balance sheets, using callable capital and guarantees more aggressively, and channelling rechannelled Special Drawing Rights through the banks — could expand lending headroom by several hundred billion dollars over a decade without new paid-in capital, at a moment when new capital is politically scarce ([G20 / World Bank, \*Boosting MDBs' Investment Capacity\*](#)).

For an individual government, the financial pillar has a domestic and an external half, and neglecting either weakens the whole. Domestically: mobilize more revenue, lengthen the maturity profile of the debt stock so that refinancing is not concentrated in bad years, develop local-currency markets so that borrowing is not automatically a currency bet, and build a debt-management office capable of executing a swap or a restructuring competently — an institutional-capacity point that anticipates Pillar IV. Externally: press for the MDB reforms, the cheaper long-tenor capital, and, for the most distressed, the timely restructuring without which no other investment in this report is fundable. The two halves are complements. A country that neglects the domestic half has less standing to demand the external one, and the strategy works only when both are pursued together.


## 7. Pillar III — The Energy Transition as Risk Reduction

*The energy transition is usually framed as climate mitigation. It is that, but for the purposes of this strategy it is also something more immediate: the single most effective way to reduce a developing economy's exposure to imported-fuel price shocks, and to harden the power systems on which every other pillar depends.*

The framing matters because it changes the coalition. Treated purely as mitigation — a cost paid now for a diffuse, distant, global benefit — the energy transition is perpetually vulnerable to being deprioritized whenever a nearer crisis demands attention. Treated as risk reduction, it becomes something a finance minister has a domestic interest in accelerating even setting the climate aside, because it directly reduces three of the exposures that transmit polycrisis shocks: the fuel-import bill that drains foreign exchange when prices spike, the fiscal cost of fuel subsidies, and the fragility of a centralized grid dependent on imported fuel or drought-sensitive hydropower. The 2022 energy shock made this concrete for dozens of countries at once, and it is why the International Energy Agency now describes energy security, not only decarbonization, as a primary driver of clean-energy investment ([IIGCC, \*World Energy Investment 2025 Highlights Electricity Demand and Energy Security as New Drivers\*](#)).

The economics now favour the transition on its own terms. Global energy investment is set to reach roughly US\$3.3 trillion in 2025, of which about US\$2.2 trillion — twice the roughly US\$1.1 trillion going to fossil fuels — flows to clean technologies: renewables, nuclear, grids, storage, efficiency, and electrification ([IEA, \*World Energy Investment 2025\*](#)). In most markets, new solar and wind are now the cheapest available source of new generation, and modular solar-plus-storage can be deployed at the scale of a clinic, an irrigation scheme, or a telecom tower far faster than a central grid can be extended ([IRENA, \*Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2023\*](#)). A distributed, renewables-based system is also inherently more shock-resistant than the alternative: it has no single point of failure, it is not exposed to a fuel-import bill, and a solar-powered clinic keeps its vaccine refrigerator running through a grid outage. Energy transition and energy resilience, in other words, point in the same direction.

But the headline investment figure conceals the problem that the strategy has to solve, and Figure 6 makes it visible. The overwhelming majority of that US\$2.2 trillion in clean investment flows to the advanced economies and China; the developing economies outside China — home to most of the people without reliable electricity — receive only a small fraction, and their share has been roughly flat even as the global total has climbed ([IEA, \*World Energy Investment 2025: Executive Summary\*](#)). The reason is the cost-of-capital wedge of Section 6. Because clean energy is capital-intensive, it is precisely the kind of investment most penalized by a high discount rate, so the countries that would benefit most from cheap, domestically-sourced power are the ones for which its financing is most expensive. The energy pillar and the finance pillar are, at this point, the same problem viewed from two sides.



**Figure 6.** *Clean energy now attracts roughly twice the investment of fossil fuels — but little of it reaches developing economies outside China.*

Source: IEA, World Energy Investment 2025. Totals are approximate 2025 estimates; the clean-energy bar is split to indicate the concentration of investment in advanced economies and China, with the segment reaching other emerging and developing economies shown illustratively at the lower end of IEA's reported range.

The evidence on what unblocks investment is by now reasonably clear, and it is mostly about lowering the cost of capital rather than subsidizing the technology, which is already cheap. Blended finance — using scarce public and concessional money to absorb the first-loss risk that keeps private capital away — can move the effective cost of capital enough to make a project bankable, and does so at a leverage that pure grant funding cannot match. Guarantees and political-risk insurance from the multilateral development banks address the perceived-risk half of the wedge directly. Currency-hedging facilities and local-currency lending address the currency half. And structured just-transition partnerships attempt to bundle all of these around a country's own decarbonization plan. The largest of these, the Just Energy Transition Partnerships, are examined as a country case in Section 13; their early experience is a cautionary one, but the instrument is the right shape. The strategic point is that the energy pillar is delivered less by energy policy than by financial engineering — which is why it cannot be pursued in isolation from Pillar II.

Two further linkages complete the case for treating energy as a risk-reduction pillar rather than a standalone sector. The first is with institutions: reliable electricity is the substrate for the digital infrastructure — mobile connectivity, digital payments, early-warning dissemination — that Pillar IV depends on, and the pay-as-you-go solar industry, which finances home systems through mobile-money instalments, is a clean example of two systems reinforcing each other. The second is with climate resilience: a diversified, distributed, renewables-based system is more robust to the very climate extremes that a fossil-dependent, hydropower-heavy, or import-dependent system is exposed to. Building it is simultaneously mitigation, adaptation, and macroeconomic insurance — three returns on one investment, which is the signature of the double-duty spending that Section 9 argues the whole strategy should be built around.

## 8. Pillar IV — Institutional Capacity and Anticipatory Governance

*The fourth pillar is the one that determines whether the first three produce outcomes or paperwork. It is also the cheapest, the least glamorous, and the most consistently neglected — and it is where the difference between a strategy that works and one that merely spends is decided.*

Every preceding pillar has arrived, eventually, at the same bottleneck. Adaptation finance is available in principle but stalls because countries lack the project-preparation capacity to turn a national plan into a bankable pipeline. Debt relief is negotiable but slow because debtor governments lack the debt-management expertise to execute a restructuring on equal terms with their creditors. Clean-energy capital is mobilizable but sits idle without the regulatory and utility capacity to connect a plant to a grid and collect payment for its output. In each case the binding constraint is not money or technology but the capacity of the state and the multilateral system to convert them into delivered results. Institutional capacity is the fourth pillar because it is the multiplier on the other three: the same budget produces far more resilience where this capacity is strong, and far less where it is weak.

The most important shift the capacity pillar has to institutionalize is the move from reaction to *anticipation*. The traditional model of crisis response is reactive: a shock strikes, an appeal is launched, funds are raised, and assistance arrives — often months later, after the damage is done and at several times the cost of early action. Anticipatory action inverts this. It pre-agrees the trigger (a forecast crossing a threshold), pre-positions the finance (released automatically when the trigger fires), and pre-identifies the recipients (through a registry built in advance), so that support arrives *before* a predictable shock does its worst. The evidence is compelling: acting ahead of a forecast flood or drought is consistently found to be cheaper and more effective than responding afterward, and the UN's central emergency fund and a growing number of national programmes have built anticipatory windows for exactly this reason ([OCHA, Anticipatory Action](#)). Anticipatory action is the operational expression of the buffer logic in Section 2 — it is how a system stays on the safe side of a threshold — and it is almost pure institutional capacity: the money and the forecasts largely exist; what is scarce is the machinery to connect them.

That machinery is remarkably general, which is the pillar's strategic significance. A digital identity and payments system built to deliver a fuel-subsidy reform is the same system that delivers an anticipatory cash transfer before a flood, a pandemic income-support payment, and a routine social pension — a point that recurs as the clearest example of double-duty investment in Section 9. The World Bank's 2025 *State of Social Protection Report* frames the scale of the gap this infrastructure has to close: around two billion people in low- and middle-income countries are uncovered or inadequately covered by social protection, with the largest gaps in Africa and South Asia, precisely where the climate and debt exposures are greatest ([World Bank, The State of Social Protection Report 2025: The 2-Billion-Person Challenge](#)). Adaptive social protection — a permanent registry and payment rail that can scale up rapidly when a shock hits and scale back down afterward — is the single institutional investment that most improves a country's ability to absorb shocks of every kind, and it is a Pillar IV asset that pays returns across all four.

At the multilateral level, the capacity pillar has produced a cluster of new institutions since 2022 that together begin to form an architecture for anticipation and risk-sharing. The Pandemic Fund, established in 2022, finances the prevention, preparedness, and response capacity that the COVID-19 pandemic showed was catastrophically underbuilt; it has committed well over US\$2 billion and, with co-financing, mobilized a portfolio several times larger across more than a hundred countries — though still against an estimated

need on the order of US\$10 billion a year ([The Pandemic Fund, About](#)). The Global Shield against Climate Risks, launched at COP27, coordinates pre-arranged risk finance and insurance so that money reaches disaster-struck countries in days rather than months, with first packages developed for a set of climate-vulnerable states ([Global Shield against Climate Risks](#)). These are examined in Section 10 as parts of the financing architecture; the point here is that they are, at bottom, capacity institutions — their function is to have the trigger, the finance, and the delivery mechanism agreed *before* the shock, which is the entire content of anticipatory governance.

The hardest part of the capacity pillar is the part that no external partner can supply: continuity. A resilience strategy plays out over decades, across electoral cycles, changes of government, and shifts in donor fashion. The institutions that deliver it — the debt office, the meteorological agency, the social-registry unit, the project-preparation facility — need statutory protection, professional staffing insulated from patronage, and budgets that survive a change of minister. This is the least fundable and least glamorous item in the entire strategy, and it is decisive. The country cases in Section 13 differ less in the quality of their plans than in the durability of the institutions that carried them, and the single best predictor of whether a country will absorb the next decade's shocks well is not its income or its exposure but whether it has built, and protected, the capacity to act before the shock arrives.

## 9. Integration: How the Pillars Reinforce One Another

*The argument for treating the four pillars as one strategy rests on a specific, checkable claim: that investment in each pillar raises the return of the others. Where that claim holds, a small set of investments does double or triple duty, and those investments are where the strategy should concentrate.*

The framework's central assertion is that the pillars are complements, not substitutes. It is worth being explicit about what would make that assertion false. If the pillars were substitutes, a dollar spent on climate resilience would come at the expense of energy or finance, the returns would be roughly independent, and the right approach would be to optimize each separately and let them compete for the budget. The claim of this report is the opposite: that the cross-effects are large and positive, so that the return to the portfolio exceeds the sum of the returns to its parts. Figure 7 sets out those cross-effects as a matrix — for each pillar, how strongly investing in it strengthens the capacity of each of the others. The matrix is illustrative, but its pattern is not arbitrary; it reflects the specific mechanisms traced through Sections 5 to 8.

|              |                        |                         |                     |                   |                        |
|--------------|------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
| investing in | Climate resilience     | —                       | moderate            | weak              | moderate               |
|              | Development finance    | strong                  | —                   | strong            | moderate               |
|              | Energy transition      | moderate                | moderate            | —                 | weak                   |
|              | Institutional capacity | strong                  | moderate            | moderate          | —                      |
|              |                        | Climate resilience      | Development finance | Energy transition | Institutional capacity |
|              |                        | strengthens capacity in |                     |                   |                        |

**Figure 7.** Cross-pillar reinforcement: how strongly investment in each pillar (rows) strengthens the capacity of the others (columns).

Source: author's synthesis of the mechanisms discussed in Sections 5–8; strengths are an illustrative ordinal reading, not an empirical estimate. The matrix is deliberately asymmetric: development finance and institutional capacity are the strongest enablers of the others, which is why the strategy sequences them early.

Read the matrix by row. Development finance is the strongest enabler: cheaper capital and restored fiscal space are what make adaptation, clean energy, and institution-building affordable in the first place, which

is why its row is heavy. Institutional capacity is nearly as strong: the registries, project-preparation units, and delivery systems it builds are what convert finance into adaptation and energy access, and its data and forecasting functions are the substrate of early warning. Climate resilience feeds back into finance — a country that has adapted and insured is a better credit risk, and disaster-clause debt instruments make the link explicit — and into energy, since a resilient grid is one designed for the climate it will actually face. The energy transition strengthens finance by removing a chronic drain on foreign exchange, and strengthens institutions by electrifying the digital infrastructure they run on. The matrix is asymmetric by design, and the asymmetry is the point: the two pillars whose rows are heaviest, finance and institutions, are the ones the strategy should build first, because they raise the return on everything that follows.

The practical expression of these synergies is a set of investments that sit at the intersection of two or more pillars and therefore pay returns in all of them at once. These are the highest-value targets in the entire strategy, because in a world of scarce capital and scarcer administrative capacity, an investment that strengthens one system is good but an investment that strengthens three is transformative. Table 2 identifies the principal double- and triple-duty investments, the pillars each one serves, and the mechanism by which it does so. The recurrence of a small number of enabling technologies across the table — digital identity and payments above all — is the operational core of the report's argument.

**Table 2. Double- and triple-duty investments: where a single investment strengthens several pillars at once**

| Investment                                       | Pillars served | Mechanism of cross-pillar return                                                                                                                                                               |
|--------------------------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Digital ID and payment rails                     | I · III · IV   | One platform delivers anticipatory transfers before disasters, subsidy-reform compensation, and social protection — and enables pay-as-you-go clean energy; the foundational double-duty asset |
| Multi-hazard early warning and data systems      | I · IV         | Cuts disaster mortality directly (the largest single BCR in the report) while building the forecasting and data capacity the whole strategy runs on                                            |
| Distributed renewables plus storage              | I · III · IV   | Cuts emissions and fuel-import exposure, hardens power against climate shocks, and keeps the digital and health systems of Pillar IV running through outages                                   |
| Regional grid and trade interconnection          | I · III        | Lets a country ride out a local drought or plant outage by importing power, and blunts food-price spikes by moving surpluses across borders                                                    |
| Debt relief and state-contingent clauses         | I · II · IV    | Restores the fiscal space that funds every other investment, and clauses that pause repayment after a disaster act as automatic contingency finance                                            |
| Adaptive social protection                       | I · II · IV    | A pre-built registry and payment rail that scales up on a shock trigger — the single institutional asset that most improves absorption of shocks of every kind                                 |
| Project-preparation and debt-management capacity | II · III · IV  | Converts available finance into a bankable pipeline and executes restructurings competently — the bottleneck that idle capital most often hits                                                 |

*"Pillars served" refers to the four pillars of Table 1 (I climate resilience, II development finance, III energy transition, IV institutional capacity). These are the investments the strategy should prioritise precisely because their returns are spread across pillars.*

Two implications follow for how the strategy is built. The first is a prioritization rule: given limited resources, prefer investments high in Table 2 — those that serve three pillars — over single-purpose spending, even when a single-purpose project has a marginally higher standalone return, because the portfolio return of the multi-pillar investment is larger once the cross-effects are counted. The second is a warning about sequencing, developed in Section 12: because the synergies run through finance and institutions, a strategy that funds visible hardware (solar farms, sea walls) while starving the unglamorous enabling capacity (registries, debt offices, meteorological agencies) will systematically underperform, because it is building the parts of the system whose returns *depend* on the parts it is neglecting. Integration is not a slogan about everything being connected. It is a specific instruction to spend where the connections are densest.

## 10. Financing the Strategy: Instruments and the Capitalisation Gap

*A recognisable financial architecture for polycrisis risk reduction has been assembled since 2022. Its problem is not design but scale: nearly every instrument is capitalised at a small fraction of the need it was built to meet.*

One of the more encouraging developments of the past four years is that the world has stopped trying to manage polycrisis with the instruments of the 2010s and has begun building new ones fitted to the problem. The result is not a single fund or authority — the fragmented governance of Section 11 makes that impossible — but a layered set of instruments, each targeting a different stage of the risk cycle: shrinking the drivers, transferring and pre-arranging risk, responding when shocks strike, and reforming the rules that govern capital flows. Table 3 inventories the principal instruments, their function, their approximate capitalization as of 2026, and the scale of the need each was created to address. Read down the final two columns, the table tells a single story.

**Table 3. The financing and risk architecture: instruments, capitalisation, and the gap to need**

| Instrument                                 | Function                                                       | Approx. capitalisation (2026)                         | Scale of need                            |
|--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Adaptation finance (public, international) | Fund resilient infrastructure, early warning, drought-proofing | ~US\$26B per year (2023 flows)                        | US\$310–365B per year by 2035            |
| Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage     | Compensate losses adaptation cannot prevent                    | Under US\$1B pledged                                  | Hundreds of billions per year            |
| Pandemic Fund                              | Build prevention, preparedness, response capacity              | >US\$2B committed; larger portfolio with co-financing | ~US\$10B per year                        |
| Global Shield / pre-arranged risk finance  | Deliver disaster payouts in days, not months                   | First country packages; early-stage                   | Pre-arranged share of relief still small |
| IMF Resilience and Sustainability Trust    | Long-tenor finance for climate and pandemic resilience         | ~SDR 40B pledged                                      | Broad demand across eligible members     |
| MDB reform (balance-sheet optimisation)    | Expand lending without new paid-in capital                     | Several hundred US\$B headroom over a decade          | Trillions in SDG and climate investment  |
| Baku-to-Belém climate finance roadmap      | Scale total climate finance for developing countries           | Roadmap agreed at COP29–COP30                         | US\$1.3 trillion per year by 2035        |

*Figures are approximate, drawn from the sources cited in the surrounding text and current as of early 2026; "need" figures are order-of-magnitude reference estimates from the same sources, not official targets. The consistent pattern — capitalisation an order of magnitude or more below need — is the point.*

The starkest entry is loss and damage. The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage is the right instrument — a dedicated multilateral channel to stand behind the residual losses that no amount of adaptation can prevent — but its pledges of well under a billion dollars sit against needs estimated in the hundreds of

billions a year, a gap of two to three orders of magnitude ([UNFCCC, \*Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage\*](#)). The Pandemic Fund tells a milder version of the same story: real money committed and a genuine portfolio built across more than a hundred countries, but against an annual need roughly five times its cumulative commitments ([The Pandemic Fund](#)). The adaptation gap of Figure 4 is the same pattern at the largest scale. In each case the instrument exists, the governance works, and the capitalization is a fraction of the requirement. The binding constraint on the financing architecture is not that it lacks the right tools. It is that the tools are too small.

Two instruments in the table are different in kind, because they multiply money rather than merely disburse it, and they deserve emphasis for that reason. The first is MDB reform. By optimizing their balance sheets — using callable capital and guarantees more aggressively, adjusting capital-adequacy frameworks, and channelling rechannelled Special Drawing Rights through the banks — the multilateral development banks can expand their lending headroom by several hundred billion dollars over a decade without a dollar of new paid-in capital, which is precisely the kind of leverage a fiscally constrained moment requires ([G20 / World Bank, \*The Triple Agenda: Boosting MDBs' Financing Capacity\*](#)). The second is blended finance and the guarantee instruments discussed in Section 7, which use scarce public money to absorb first-loss risk and thereby mobilize several multiples of private capital. In a world where grant and concessional money is capped by donor budgets that are, if anything, shrinking, these leverage instruments are the only route by which the architecture reaches the scale of the need, and expanding them is the highest-priority financing reform in the strategy.

The overarching financing question is therefore how to move from the small, fragmented instruments of Table 3 toward the trillion-dollar scale that the Baku-to-Belém roadmap and the Sevilla Commitment set as their destination. The honest answer is that no single decision gets there. It requires the MDB reforms to deliver their headroom, the blended-finance instruments to scale and standardize, the debt overhang of Section 6 to be resolved so that developing countries can borrow again, and the loss-and-damage and adaptation funds to be capitalized at something approaching their mandates — and it requires all of this to happen in the fragmented, competitive governance environment that the next section describes. The instruments are the easy part. The hard part is the coordination and the capital, and those are political.

## 11. Governance: Coordinating a Strategy in a Fragmented System

*A strategy that requires coordination arrives at the worst possible moment for it. The central governance challenge is to design for resilience in a system that the risk analysts themselves rank fragmentation as its top near-term threat.*

There is an uncomfortable tension at the heart of this report. The four-pillar strategy it describes depends on coordination — between countries, between the climate and finance tracks of the multilateral system, between public and private capital, between this year's crisis response and next decade's resilience. Yet the *Global Risks Report 2026* ranks geoeconomic confrontation as the risk most likely to trigger a global crisis, describes an "age of competition" in which cooperation is receding, and documents the retreat of several major powers from the very multilateral commitments the strategy relies on ([WEF, \*Global Risks Report 2026: Geopolitical and Economic Risks Rise in a New Age of Competition\*](#)). The strategy has to be built for the world that exists, not the one it would prefer. That means designing for resilience *to* fragmentation, not assuming it away.

The good news is that the governance of polycrisis risk reduction does not require, and should not wait for, a single global authority. What it requires is something looser and more achievable: a shared frame, a set of interoperable institutions, and a few forums where the pieces can be aligned. Much of the necessary architecture already exists in distributed form. The UNFCCC process carries the climate and adaptation agenda. The IMF, World Bank, and the wider MDB system carry finance and debt. The G20 has become the main forum in which MDB reform, debt restructuring, and financing-for-development are actually negotiated. The UN's Financing for Development process produced the Sevilla Commitment as a shared framework across all of these. No one of these bodies governs the strategy, but together they cover its pillars — and the task is less to build new institutions than to connect the ones that exist so that the climate track and the finance track, in particular, stop operating as if they were unrelated.

Where the existing governance is weakest is precisely at the couplings that Section 2 identified as the locus of risk. The debt system and the climate system are institutionally separate, so a country facing both a debt crisis and a climate disaster must negotiate with two entirely different sets of actors under two different logics — which is why innovations that bridge them, such as disaster-clause debt instruments and debt-for-climate swaps, are disproportionately valuable. Country platforms — arrangements in which a government convenes its external partners around a single national investment plan rather than negotiating with each separately — are the most promising governance innovation for exactly this reason: they force the coordination at the level where the pillars actually meet, the country. The Just Energy Transition Partnerships of Section 13 are an early, imperfect instance of the country-platform model, and their lessons, good and bad, are among the most important in the report.

The role of smaller and more exposed states in this governance deserves particular attention, because they have been its most effective entrepreneurs. The Bridgetown Initiative, launched by Barbados, reshaped the global debate on development finance and MDB reform out of all proportion to the size of its sponsor, precisely by articulating a clear, technically credible agenda that larger powers could then adopt ([Government of Barbados, \*The 2022 Bridgetown Initiative\*](#)). The V20 group of climate-vulnerable economies, representing some 1.7 billion people, has played a similar convening role on risk finance and

the Global Shield. This is a governance lesson worth stating plainly: in a fragmented system, agenda-setting leadership does not have to come from the largest actors, and often comes from the most exposed ones, whose incentive to solve the problem is sharpest. A viable governance strategy leans on that coalition — the exposed states, the reformist MDBs, the philanthropic and private capital willing to take first-loss positions — rather than waiting for a great-power consensus that the risk reports say is not coming.

The realistic governance objective, then, is not integration under a single roof but *coherence* across many. Concretely: a shared analytical frame so that the climate, finance, and development communities are solving the same problem; interoperable instruments so that a disaster-clause bond, an anticipatory-action trigger, and a social registry built in one context can be reused in another; country platforms so that coordination happens where the pillars meet; and a standing coalition of the exposed and the reformist to keep the agenda moving when the great powers are competing rather than cooperating. None of this requires the age of competition to end. It requires the strategy to be robust to it — which is the most that can honestly be designed for, and, the country cases suggest, enough to make a large difference.

## 12. Sequencing and Prioritisation: A Decision Rule

*A strategy is defined as much by order as by content. Because the pillars depend on one another, and because resources and capacity are finite, the sequence in which the strategy's elements are pursued determines how much of it is achievable at all.*

The synergy analysis of Section 9 implies a sequencing logic directly. Because development finance and institutional capacity are the strongest enablers of the other pillars — the heaviest rows in Figure 7 — they should, in general, come first: not because adaptation and clean energy matter less, but because their returns depend on the fiscal space and the delivery capacity that finance and institutions provide. Pouring adaptation money into a country with no project-preparation capacity produces studies, not sea walls; financing a solar programme in a country whose utility cannot connect a plant or collect a bill produces stranded assets. The enabling pillars are the ones whose absence turns spending on the others into waste, so they have priority in sequence even where they do not have priority in ultimate importance.

Beyond that general ordering, the strategy needs a decision rule for triaging specific investments, and the most useful one sorts actions into three tiers by the certainty and breadth of their returns. Table 4 sets out the tiers with examples drawn from each pillar. The first tier is *no-regret* actions: investments whose returns are large and positive across essentially all plausible futures, so that there is no scenario in which building them was a mistake. Early warning systems, digital ID and payment rails, and adaptive social registries are the paradigm cases — cheap, high-return, and useful whatever shock arrives next. These should be built now, everywhere, without waiting for the debt or the coordination questions to be resolved, because they pay for themselves and because they are the enabling infrastructure on which the later tiers depend.

**Table 4. A sequencing rule: three tiers by certainty and breadth of return**

| Tier                       | Selection criterion                                                                  | Illustrative actions across the pillars                                                                                                                                                                 |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. No-regret, now          | Large positive return under essentially all futures; enables later tiers             | Multi-hazard early warning; digital ID and payment rails; adaptive social registries; debt-management and project-preparation capacity; distributed solar for critical facilities                       |
| 2. Enabling and contingent | High return but conditional on finance, coordination, or reform being unlocked first | Debt restructuring for the distressed; MDB-backed guarantees and blended-finance facilities; regional grid and trade interconnection; national adaptation-plan pipelines; state-contingent debt clauses |
| 3. Transformational        | Largest long-run payoff; requires scale, capital, and sustained political continuity | Full clean-energy system build-out; universal social protection; deep resilient-infrastructure programmes; large-scale risk-pooling and loss-and-damage finance at need-scale                           |

*The tiers are a decision heuristic, not a rigid timeline; a well-resourced country pursues all three in parallel, while a constrained one uses the tiers to triage. The logic is to build first what pays off under every scenario and enables everything else.*

The second tier is *enabling and contingent* actions: investments with high returns that are conditional on some prior unlock — a debt restructuring completed, a guarantee facility stood up, a regional agreement reached. These cannot simply be willed into place, because they depend on the finance and coordination questions of Sections 10 and 11; but they are the investments that the first tier makes possible and the third tier requires, so the strategy's job is to clear their preconditions in parallel with building the no-regret base.

The third tier is *transformational*: the full clean-energy build-out, universal social protection, deep resilient-infrastructure programmes — the investments with the largest long-run payoff but also the largest requirements in capital, scale, and sustained political continuity. These are the destination, but attempting them before the enabling tiers are in place is how resilience programmes fail expensively.

The sequencing rule also resolves a tension that runs through the whole strategy: the tension between urgency and patience. The physical and financial data of Section 3 create enormous pressure to act on the largest, most visible problems immediately — to build the sea wall, finance the solar farm, capitalize the loss-and-damage fund. That pressure is legitimate, but acting on it directly, without first building the enabling tiers, is the reactive trap the strategy is meant to escape. The discipline the tiers impose is to spend the first years of the strategy building the unglamorous no-regret infrastructure that makes everything after it cheaper and more effective — the registries, the warning systems, the debt and delivery capacity — even while the pressure is to spend on hardware. Countries that have done this, the next section shows, absorbed the subsequent decade's shocks at a fraction of the cost paid by those that skipped it.

## 13. Applications: The Strategy in Practice

*The integrated strategy is not hypothetical. Its elements can be seen, in partial and instructive form, in the recent experience of a handful of countries — including one cautionary case that shows what happens when the coordination fails.*

### 13.1 Barbados: small-state leadership and the integration of debt and climate

Barbados is the clearest demonstration that the finance and climate pillars can be integrated rather than negotiated separately, and that leadership on the agenda need not come from the largest states. It pioneered the inclusion of natural-disaster and pandemic clauses in its sovereign bonds, so that debt-service payments pause automatically when a qualifying disaster strikes — a mechanism that converts a debt instrument into a piece of contingency finance and directly bridges the two pillars that Section 11 identified as institutionally divorced. It was an early user of the IMF's Resilience and Sustainability Trust, and it executed a debt-for-climate swap that freed resources for water and sewerage investment. Most consequentially, through the Bridgetown Initiative it turned a small island's predicament into the reference agenda for global MDB reform and development-finance restructuring, shaping the debates that produced the Sevilla Commitment ([Government of Barbados, \*The 2022 Bridgetown Initiative\*](#)). Barbados is small and its debt burden real, but it shows the integrated strategy working: instruments that serve two pillars at once, and agenda-setting leadership from the most exposed.

### 13.2 Bangladesh: institutional capacity and the mortality dividend

Bangladesh is the standing proof of the mortality dividend visible in Figure 2 — the demonstration that institutional capacity, more than income, determines how a rising hazard load translates into human cost. A cyclone of comparable strength to the 1970 Bhola cyclone, which killed on the order of 300,000 people, now produces deaths in the tens or low hundreds. The difference is not that the storms are weaker; it is the Cyclone Preparedness Programme's network of shelters and tens of thousands of trained community volunteers, an early-warning and evacuation system built and sustained over decades. This is Pillar IV made concrete: a no-regret, high-return investment in warning and delivery capacity, protected across changes of government, that has saved more lives than almost any other single adaptation programme in the world. Bangladesh's remaining challenge is to extend the same institutional durability from the cyclone-response system, which is world-class, to the slower-onset risks of flooding, salinity, and heat — and to fund it against the debt and fiscal constraints of Section 6.

### 13.3 Indonesia: the cautionary case of a just-transition partnership

Indonesia's Just Energy Transition Partnership is the report's cautionary case, and it is included because the strategy's failure modes are as instructive as its successes. Announced at the 2022 G20 summit in Bali, the JETP mobilized a headline US\$20 billion — half public, half private — to move Indonesia's power system off coal, and it was built on exactly the country-platform model that Section 11 endorsed: external partners convened around a single national plan. Yet by late 2025 the partnership had approved only around US\$3.1 billion of the headline figure, its progress described as slow and its future in doubt, and in 2025 the United States withdrew from the International Partners Group entirely ([Wikipedia, \*Indonesia Just Energy Transition Partnership\*](#); [JETP Indonesia Secretariat](#)). The lessons map directly onto this report's argument.

The finance was too heavily weighted toward loans rather than the concessional and grant money that shifts the cost-of-capital wedge of Section 5; the coordination proved fragile to exactly the great-power competition that Section 11 warned about; and the institutional capacity to convert a headline pledge into connected, operating projects was underbuilt. The instrument is the right shape. Its execution shows how much the enabling pillars — finance on the right terms, durable coordination, delivery capacity — actually matter.

### **13.4 Rwanda and Kenya: building the enabling base**

Rwanda and Kenya illustrate the no-regret first tier of Section 12 — the deliberate construction of enabling capacity ahead of the shocks that will test it. Rwanda built a national environment and climate fund, FONERWA, that channels domestic and external resources through the government's own planning system rather than a parallel donor architecture, and it has invested consistently in the state capacity and social-protection systems that convert plans into delivery. Kenya runs a Hunger Safety Net Programme whose transfers scale up automatically on a drought trigger — a working instance of the adaptive social protection and anticipatory action of Section 8 — and has built a power system drawing heavily on geothermal and other renewables, reducing its exposure to the fuel-import shock of Section 7. Neither country is wealthy, and both face the debt and financing constraints this report documents. What distinguishes them is that they built the registries, the funds, the triggers, and the delivery systems — the unglamorous enabling infrastructure — before the crises arrived, which is precisely the sequencing the strategy prescribes.

The cases differ in geography, income, and exposure, but they converge on a single lesson. What separates the countries that absorb shocks well from those that do not is not primarily their wealth or even the size of their hazard, but whether they built and protected the enabling capacity — the fiscal space, the delivery institutions, the pre-arranged finance, the durable coordination — before it was needed. That is the integrated strategy's central practical claim, and the cases, including the cautionary one, bear it out.

## 14. Metrics and Accountability: Knowing Whether It Works

*A strategy that cannot be measured cannot be managed. The final design question is what to track — and the right metrics are the ones that capture the integration the strategy is built around, not just activity within each pillar.*

The temptation in measuring a four-pillar strategy is to measure each pillar separately: dollars of adaptation finance, megawatts of clean energy, basis points of spread, people covered by social protection. Those indicators matter and appear in Table 1, but on their own they miss the strategy's entire point, which is integration. A country could show progress on every pillar-specific metric while its systems remained as tightly and dangerously coupled as before. The metrics that matter most are therefore the ones that capture the reduction of *systemic risk* — the outcomes the whole strategy exists to produce — rather than activity within any single pillar.

Four categories of outcome metric follow from the argument. The first is *avoided loss and the mortality dividend*: the ratio of economic losses to lives lost from disasters, tracked over time, which is the single clearest measure of whether the protective infrastructure is working — the divergence in Figure 2 made into a management target. The second is *pre-arrangement*: the share of disaster and crisis finance that is agreed before the shock rather than raised after it, which directly measures the shift from reaction to anticipation that Section 8 identified as the core of the capacity pillar. This metric is currently low and rising, and driving it upward is among the most consequential things the strategy can do. The third is *fiscal space protected*: the share of government revenue consumed by debt service, and its trajectory, which measures whether the finance pillar is restoring the capacity to absorb shocks or losing ground to them.

The fourth category is the hardest to measure and the most important: *coupling itself*. The strategy's deepest claim is that it reduces the strength of the transmission channels along which shocks propagate — that after the strategy, a monetary shock is less likely to become a food crisis, a drought less likely to become a debt crisis. Measuring that requires tracking the correlations between shocks and their propagation across systems, which is analytically demanding and institutionally homeless, since no single body owns cross-system risk. Building that measurement capacity — a standing, credible assessment of how coupled the global risk system actually is, and whether the coupling is loosening — is itself an institutional-capacity investment, and arguably the one whose absence most handicaps the whole enterprise. What cannot be measured cannot be managed, and cross-system risk is, at present, badly measured.

Accountability, finally, has to be located somewhere, and in a fragmented system it cannot be located in a single authority. The realistic model is distributed accountability against a shared frame: each institution in the governance constellation of Section 11 reporting against a common set of outcome metrics, aggregated by a credible independent body, and reviewed in the forums — the G20, the Financing for Development follow-up, the UNFCCC global stocktake — where the pillars are actually negotiated. The Sevilla Commitment and the Baku-to-Belém roadmap both created monitoring processes of this kind; whether they are given the data, the independence, and the political attention to function is one of the more important and least glamorous questions on which the strategy's success depends.

## 15. Conclusion: From Crisis Management to Strategic Resilience

*The shift the moment demands is from managing crises one at a time to reducing the systemic risk that makes them compound. The knowledge and the instruments largely exist; what is missing is integration, capital, and the will to build before the shock.*

This report began with a diagnosis and has ended with a design. The diagnosis is that the defining danger of the present is not the size of any single hazard but the coupling between hazards — the transmission of shocks across systems that used to be independent, driven by a rising physical hazard load, a fragile fiscal position across much of the developing world, and a fragmenting geopolitics that both raises the odds of shocks and erodes the cooperation needed to manage them. The design is a four-pillar strategy — climate resilience, development finance, the energy transition, and institutional capacity — pursued not as four separate agendas but as one integrated system, on the argument, set out in Section 9 and Figure 7, that the pillars are complements whose combined return exceeds the sum of their parts.

Several conclusions have recurred and are worth stating plainly. Resilience is not primarily a technical problem: the highest-return interventions are known, and their benefit–cost ratios — four to one for resilient infrastructure, above ten to one for adaptation broadly, around nine to one for early warning — are among the best available anywhere in public policy. The binding constraints are financial and institutional. They are financial because a debt overhang and a cost-of-capital wedge have consumed the fiscal space and priced out the capital that the whole agenda requires, which is why development finance is the enabling pillar. They are institutional because money and technology do not become outcomes without the anticipatory, delivery, and data capacity of the state and the multilateral system, which is why institutional capacity is the multiplier on everything else. And the returns concentrate in a small set of double- and triple-duty investments — digital ID and payments, early warning, adaptive social protection, distributed clean energy, resolved debt — that strengthen several pillars at once and are where scarce capital and attention should go first.

The strategy also has to be honest about its environment. It is being proposed in what the risk analysts themselves call an age of competition, in which the coordination it depends on is receding and major powers are withdrawing from the multilateral commitments it relies on. The response is not to assume that environment away but to design for resilience to it: to build the no-regret enabling infrastructure that pays off under any future, to lean on the coalition of the exposed and the reformist that has repeatedly set the agenda, and to pursue coherence across many institutions rather than waiting for integration under one. That is a more modest ambition than a grand global bargain, and a more achievable one.

The deepest choice the strategy poses is between two postures toward risk. The reactive posture waits for each shock, responds to it at several times the cost of early action, and rebuilds the buffer only after it has been exhausted — and in a world of correlated, compounding shocks, that posture loses ground with every cycle. The anticipatory posture builds the warning systems, the pre-arranged finance, the registries, and the fiscal and institutional buffers *before* the shock, so that when it comes — and it will come — the system stays on the safe side of its thresholds and recovers faster and cheaper. The mortality dividend of Figure 2, the Bangladeshi shelters, the Kenyan drought trigger, the Barbadian disaster clause are all instances of the same posture, and they show what it buys. The task for the rest of the decade is not to invent a resilience agenda — its elements are known and its returns are proven — but to fund it, integrate it, and above all to

build it in advance of the shocks it is meant to absorb. That is the difference between managing a permanent crisis and reducing the risk that produces it, and it is a choice that is still, for now, available to make.

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This report synthesises publicly available institutional and peer-reviewed research and is analytical rather than predictive. Every quantitative claim is attributed inline to a primary or authoritative secondary source. Figures 1 and 3 are conceptual schematics; Figure 2 is an illustrative decadal series reflecting documented WMO trends; Figures 4, 5, and 6 render published estimates whose bases and caveats are given in the source lines; and Figure 7 is an explicitly illustrative reading of cross-pillar interactions rather than an empirical estimate. Where sources report ranges or revise figures between vintages, the report uses central or most recent values and notes the uncertainty. Views expressed are the author's own.