The twenty-first century is being shaped by the collision of two very different kinds of change. The first is a historic convergence: living standards, life expectancy, education, and technological capability are spreading from a small group of wealthy countries to most of humanity, and the centre of economic gravity is moving to Asia and, later in the century, toward Africa. The second is a rising load of systemic risk: a warming and increasingly unstable climate, pollution and ecosystem loss, resource and supply-chain concentration, sovereign debt stress, geopolitical fragmentation, and powerful new technologies whose governance lags their diffusion. This report asks which of the two will set the terms of the century.
The report examines the major forces in turn: the relative decline of Western dominance and the rebalancing of global power; the Asian century and its demographic limits; Africa’s demographic rise; economic convergence across the Global South; ageing, peak population, and migration; artificial intelligence and automation; energy systems and industrial transformation; climate change; pollution and human health; biodiversity and ecosystem stability; geopolitics and multipolarity; cities and infrastructure; and human exposure and survivability risk. It then assesses how these forces interact through a polycrisis lens, evaluates sustainable development as a form of risk mitigation, sets out regional outlooks to 2100, and builds three scenarios: a convergence future, a fracture future, and a most-likely path of uneven muddling through.
The central finding is that the century is neither a story of inevitable progress nor of inevitable collapse. Convergence is real, powerful, and largely demographic and technological in origin; the clean-energy cost curve, falling fertility, rising education, and the diffusion of digital tools are all moving in a favourable direction. But the same forces that raise prosperity also raise exposure, and the interactions among climate, finance, geopolitics, and technology can turn a manageable shock into a cascade. Whether progress outpaces risk depends less on any single breakthrough than on three variables: the speed of the energy transition, the quality of institutions in the fast-growing parts of the world, and the capacity of the great powers to avoid the few catastrophic tail events, above all major-power war, from which no amount of convergence can recover. Our most-likely scenario is a century of continued but unequal progress with a temperature overshoot, recurring regional crises, and a multipolar order that is more contested than the one it replaces.